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Change and Continuity in the Liberal Democrat 
General Election Campaign of 2005 
 
RICHARD S. GRAYSON  
 
THE Liberal Democrat campaign of 2005 was judged by the public to be the most 
effective of the three main campaigns.1 It also delivered tangible gains: more seats and 
more votes for the second successive election. However, the campaign has been 
criticised, and there has been disappointment within the party that the gains were not 
greater. This article considers why the party's 2005 campaign was largely the same as in 
2001, examining how far the party changed in the intervening years. It begins by 
highlighting policy changes and then argues that although policy changed significantly, 
the party's overall message remained basically the same. The nature of the party's 
election strategy and tactics are then examined, followed by an assessment of how the 
party might develop its approach in future.  
 
Changes in policy, 2001-2005  
 
Party policy changed significantly between 2001 and 2005. Some of the key developments 
came through the party's public services working group, chaired by Chris Huhne MEP (now 
MP) and consisting of spokespersons and policy experts. In August 2002, the group proposed 
decentralising decision-making on public services to a democratic local and/ or regional 
level. It also proposed a new formula for funding the education of children from 
disadvantaged backgrounds (drawing on the Dutch model), and an earmarked NHS tax 
based on the existing National Insurance system.2 Due to a massive internal consultation 
exercise carried out by the group, party conference adopted the proposals almost 
unamended. However, the public services programme was tweaked in 2004/5. First, when 
the regional assembly proposal in the north-east was defeated in November 2004, the party 
reassessed its emphasis on the regional dimension in democratic control of public services. 
Instead, its election manifesto said that 'The powers of many unelected regional and national 
quangos and administrators will be given to local cities and counties'. Second, the earmarked 
NHS tax was downplayed. This had been developed when many voters doubted whether 
extra money was going into the NHS. When it became widely accepted that there was extra 
investment, the policy no longer had such resonance and was not included in the final 
manifesto.  
The new public services policy signalled that the party now believed that delivery of public 
services was a more pressing issue than funding. In the 1992, 1997 and 2001 elections the 
Liberal Democrats had pledged to increase funding for education by putting 1 p on the basic 
rate of income tax. Yet from 1999 onwards Labour significantly increased education funding, 
so many argued that the party could not credibly argue for even more money. Several MPs 
made that argument, but the decisive figure was the Liberal Democrat Shadow Chancellor, 
Matthew Taylor MP. His February 2003 Alternative Budget did not include the 1 p policy and 
argued instead that, 'In 2003, the main issue is no longer securing additional investment. It is 
now about spending more wisely, taxing more fairly.'3 That document also set out the fiscal 
basis of the party's 2005 manifesto. This involved just one tax increase, with the introduction 
of a 50 per cent tax rate (instead of 40 per cent) on that part of people's incomes over 
£100,000 per annum. The revenue raised by that policy (£4.5 billion per annum at the time) 
would be used to scrap university tuition and top-up fees (£2 bn) and cut every council tax 
bill by £100 (at a cost of £2.5 bn) prior to replacing council tax with a local income tax. At 
once, that meant that the Liberal Democrats were no longer proposing tax increases for all 
those paying the basic rate. Instead, tax cuts for most people were proposed (through 
scrapping the council tax), while at the same time redistributing money from the wealthiest 
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1.5 per cent of taxpayers to reduce costs for others. Indeed, the party talked about this as a tax 'change' 
which helped to emphasise its redistributive nature.  
On tax policy, the only major change from February 2003 until the publication of the 
manifesto two years later was that the party's pledges on personal care could be paid for from 
the SOp tax rate. This was because official figures had shown that the cost of scrapping 
tuition fees was smaller than expected and that the SOp rate would raise more than expected. 
Given the continuity of fiscal policy from 2003 to 2005, it was ironic that when Dr Vincent 
Cable MP replaced Matthew Taylor as Shadow Chancellor in autumn 2003, he was credited 
by journalists with introducing economic rigour to the party's policy-making. Cable's 
reputation as a former Chief Economist at Shell was undoubtedly a boost to the party's 
credibility, but Taylor had shaped the overall package and continued to playa key role in 
ensuring that the sums added up.  
In shifting ground on fiscal policy, the party was also helped by the internal spending review, 
which was primarily associated with David Laws MP. In the summer of 2004 the review 
identified savings of around £5 bn per annum which could fund policies deemed more 
important by the party. The key proposals were: scrapping the Department for Trade and 
Industry (using the saving for several policies including increased pensions); using money 
from the proposed ID card scheme to fund extra police; and spending money on reducing 
primary school class sizes instead of the Child Trust Fund. This was a significant departure 
from the party's 2001 manifesto which had included only modest savings, and illustrates how 
much political debates had shifted in the intervening years.  
One further area of change was crime policy, which was long seen as a weak issue for the 
party. When Mark Oaten MP became Shadow Home Secretary in late 2003, he began to use 
the language of 'tough liberalism'. This caused some alarm among activists, who saw 'tough 
liberalism' as pandering to tabloids. However, the core of Oaten's policies remained 
impeccably liberal, with an emphasis on crime prevention and rehabilitation of offenders. He 
took the view that the genuinely 'tough' approach to crime was to prevent it in the first place, 
rather than simply to lock up offenders as a form of punishment, regardless of whether that 
might make them likely to reoffend. He therefore began to push through shifts in the 
language used to describe party policy. This made the party more confident in talking about 
crime than previously, and many MPs felt they had a more effective message on crime than 
in 2001.  
 
The manifesto and the message  
 
The changes in policy potentially meant that the party's message would change significantly 
compared to 2001. Surprisingly, it remained broadly the same, with the party creating an 
overall impression that it would increase taxes (if only on a small number of people) to fund, 
for example, scrapping university tuition fees. Two main reasons can be identified for this: 
the influence of the overall campaign strategy; and the impact of the party's local income tax 
policy.  
The most important factor was that those with overall responsibility for the campaign, 
especially Lord (Chris) Rennard, the party's Chief Executive, argued that polling has 
consistently demonstrated that scrapping tuition fees is popular. Other messages, such as 
decentralising decision-making, do not have the same appeal, and are often not understood. 
Similarly, it was believed that an anti-crime policy based on recruiting extra police was more 
likely to win votes than talking about rehabilitating offenders, even using the language of 
'tough liberalism'. For those reasons, the party's manifesto was built around ten core 
messages which tended to emphasise long-standing aspects of policy more than some of the 
recent changes. The first stage of the manifesto was the pre-manifesto, produced for debate 
at party conference in September 2004. The Federal Policy Committee has formal 
responsibility for manifestos, but the three key figures in the daily work were Matthew Taylor 
MP (as Chair of the manifesto process), myself (as Director of Policy) and Claire Bentham (a 
Policy Officer with general responsibility for manifestos). Matthew Taylor assumed a greater 
role in the drafting of the final manifesto as both myself and Claire Bentham left the 
employment of the party in the summer of 2004 to pursue careers in education. As the core 
of the manifesto was complete by that stage, our roles were not directly replaced, although 
Christian Moon, as Head of the Policy Unit, took on some of the manifesto drafting.  
In writing the pre-manifesto we consulted many different parts of the party. The nature of 
that process, and the remit we were given, meant that the pre-manifesto had a strong 
campaigning focus. In particular, it included ten headline 'Reasons to Vote Liberal 
Democrat'. These included policies such as 'Free personal care when you need it-no one 
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forced to sell their home to pay for care' and 'No tuition fees, no top-up fees - university affordable for 
every student'. However, there were also general positioning statements such as 'We should 
not have gone to war in Iraq-it's time to restore trust in the Government.' These points 
remained the basis of the Liberal Democrat message, although they were made more punchy 
for the final package launched in late March 2005. Then, each of the ten final messages was 
put into the same 'oppose/propose' format. So, for example, on environmental policy, the 
pre-manifesto pledge to 'Take the environment seriously-cut pollution, cut congestion, and 
boost renewable energy' was replaced with the statement 'We oppose: ignoring climate 
change. We propose: cleaner transport & cleaner energy'.  
Aside from the campaign focus of the manifesto, a further reason that the overall message in 
2005 remained similar to that of 2001 was the importance given to local income tax (LIT). 
That was not because it had been important in 2001 (it had not), but because it created the 
impression that the Liberal Democrats were proposing general tax increases. Although the 
party's income tax changes applied to a small number of people (the 1.5 per cent of taxpayers 
with incomes over £100,000 per year, compared to all basic rate taxpayers in 2001), many 
more people believed that their tax bills would increase with LIT. In fact, three-quarters of 
people stood to gain or pay no more than under council tax, but LIT had an impact on the 
perceptions of many voters who did not believe themselves to be affluent: households with 
an annual income of around £40,000 were on the margin of those who would pay more. This 
helped suggest that the Liberal Democrats would increase tax overall at a time when people 
are increasingly questioning the efficacy of increasing taxes.  
 
Continuity in campaigning  
 
In addition to continuity in the party's message, there was also continuity in the way that 
message was delivered. One explanation of that is the continuity of key figures at a senior 
level in the decision-making process. In the party's middle management, there was 
significant change, especially in the press operation. Nobody in a major press role in 2005 
had been working for the party in 2001: Jackie Rowley replaced Daisy Sampson heading the 
leader's press operation, while Mark Littlewood took over from Robin Banerji who had in 
turn replaced Elizabeth Peplow as head of the party press office. A new post of 'Director of 
General Election Communications' had been filled by Sandy Walkington, and David Walter's 
post of Director of Communications had disappeared. Yet at a senior level, there was marked 
continuity: Lord (Tim) Razzall was Chair of the campaign (in his role as Chair of the 
Campaigns and Communications Committee); Lord (Chris) Rennard was Director of the 
campaign; and Lord (Dick) Newby was the Leader's Chief of Staff. All three had the same 
positions in 200l.  
The most important aspect of this continuity is the influence of Chris Rennard. In 2001, 
Rennard had been the party's Director of Campaigns and Elections and in that role already 
had a deep influence on party strategy. However, in autumn 2003 he had been promoted to 
Chief Executive, which gave him even more influence on the party organisation. Yet his 
impact is not solely associated with the post he holds. More significant is that he has 
persuaded key figures that his approach works, and many parliamentarians believe that they 
owe their seats to his campaigning methods. Andrew Russell and Edward Fieldhouse 
established Rennard's influence in their detailed study of seventy key Liberal Democrats. 
They said, 'All interviewees were asked who they felt controlled the party. Not only was 
Rennard the most popular answer, but more than twice as many of our non-representative, 
but carefully selected, sample mentioned Rennard than Ashdown and Kennedy combined.'4 
The result of this was broad acceptance of Rennard's judgement that the 2001 campaign was 
successful and should be replicated.  
As a result, the 2001 model of repeating key messages was the core of the campaign. For that 
reason, the general election slogan, 'the real alternative', was launched at the party's spring 
conference in Harrogate in early March, a month before the formal campaign began. Soon 
after, the party launched its ten core election messages through national newspaper adverts. 
With the key messages in the public domain, tried and tested tactics were used to promote 
them. First, resources were targeted on 'key seats' (usually described in the media as 'target 
seats'). This is done because polling shows that the biggest factor people cite in not voting 
Liberal Democrat is a belief that the party cannot win in their seat. Targeting seeks to show 
that on the contrary, the Liberal Democrats are stronger than other parties in specific areas. 
Second, the party leader travelled around the country by 'battlebus' and aeroplane on a 
'Leader's Tour'. This was heavily focused on generating local and regional media coverage in 
specific constituencies, of which Charles Kennedy visited 39 in the campaign. It began with a 
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'Flying Start' running for three days from 5 to 7 April. During that time, Kennedy emphasised the ten 
core messages in visits to nine different towns and cities. A particular feature of the Flying 
Start was the argument that the Liberal Democrats would be fighting a positive campaign. 
Kennedy said, 'We're going to address people's hopes, not play on their fears.' Third, on each 
day of the campaign, the party followed a pre-agreed plan, highlighting core messages, 
beginning with a 7.30 am press conference. The aim of such an approach was to secure 
broadcast headlines along the lines of 'The Liberal Democrats today focused on their plans to 
scrap tuition fees.' These press conferences (which have been part of the party's campaigning 
since 1992) followed the same pattern as in 2001, with Kennedy making introductory 
remarks, followed by the relevant spokesperson, with Tim Razzall in the chair. Questions 
from journalists then followed. The only obvious change to 2001 was that the panel sat in 
armchairs around a coffee table rather than behind the more formal press conference set. 
This change was believed to suit Kennedy's conversational style.  
However, there were departures from the basic pattern of the campaign, sometimes dictated 
by events outside politics. The birth of the Kennedys' first baby on 12 April saw the party's 
Deputy Leader, Sir Menzies Campbell, carrying out leadership duties for a few days. 
Meanwhile, the funeral of the Pope and the wedding of Prince Charles and Camilla Parker-
Bowles led to parties suspending national campaigning on 8 and 9 April. Otherwise, there 
were only two political 'events' which significantly diverted the Liberal Democrats from their 
plan of repeating different key messages each day. The first was the manifesto launch on 14 
April. At this, many journalists focused on the effects of the party's local income tax policy 
(LIT). Kennedy was asked whether LIT would raise the same amount as council tax, and how 
much people would earn before they paid more tax with LIT, but he fluffed the answers. This 
was potentially damaging as it suggested there was confusion over the details of the policy. 
However, it became clear in the broadcast media later in the day, and then in anecdotal 
evidence from campaigners, that the public and some journalists excused Kennedy's 
performance as he had returned home with a new baby only two days before. If anything, it 
appeared to strengthen the public view that Kennedy is 'human', although it remains to be 
seen what impact it will have had on long-term impressions about his capabilities as a 
potential Prime Minister.  
The second 'event' was Iraq. The Liberal Democrats planned to tackle foreign affairs issues 
generally towards the end of the campaign, to remind voters of the war in Iraq which was a 
key factor in moving voters from Labour. However, on 25 April the party announced one of 
the few surprise events of the campaign: the defection of the former Labour MP, Brian 
Sedgemore, partly related to Iraq. That coincided with the leak of the Attorney General's 
advice on the legality of the war on 24 April, which meant that the media spotlight was on 
Iraq. Given the strength of the issue for the Liberal Democrats, it would have been foolish for 
the party not to have made the most of it. However, the judgement of the core campaign 
team was that Iraq could not be sustained as the major campaign issue for any longer than a 
few days because senior campaigners believed that the key task for the Liberal Democrats 
was to communicate positive alternative policies on domestic issues. That approach 
dominated the rest of the campaign.  
Yet there were innovations in 2005. One was the improvement of the party's rapid rebuttal 
operation by allocating specific staff to prepare responses to attacks on Liberal Democrat 
policy by opponents. The other innovations flowed from the party's success in fundraising: 
figures from the Electoral Commission show the party having raised over £4 million in the 
first quarter of 2005 (over half of that coming from one donor), compared to £9 m for the 
Labour Party and £8 m for the Conservatives. In 2001, the party had come nowhere near to 
such fundraising. These additional funds allowed three new tactics aimed at further 
entrenching the overall strategy of repeating key messages. First, the party paid for a series of 
full page adverts in national newspapers when it launched its 'Ten Reasons to Vote Liberal 
Democrat' in late March. Second, some of these policy bullet points were used in billboard 
posters across the country. Third, the national party paid for eleven million tabloid 
newspapers to be delivered across the country as inserts in local free newspapers. However, 
even if these were innovations compared to 2001, it should be noted that they were still part 
of an identical overall strategy.  
 
Assessing the campaign  
 
The results of the election were mixed for all the parties. Labour's 'historic' third term was 
accompanied by massive haemorrhaging of support. Despite gains, the Conservatives moved 
up only slightly in the polls and the immediate afterglow of their result was soon doused by 
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rows over the succession to Michael Howard. For the Liberal Democrats, there were reasons to be pleased 
with both the campaign and the result. In the campaign, the party was successful for the first 
time in communicating a number of its domestic policies to voters.5 The headline results 
obviously represented progress: 22 per cent of votes overall (an increase of 3.8 per cent), and 
sixteen seats gained with five lost, giving a net gain of eleven seats. They increased their vote 
share by more than any other party, and their seats are now spread through both rural and 
urban areas (including cities where the Conservatives are unrepresented). Meanwhile, the 
party is now in second place in 189 seats (up from 111).  
However, there are also reasons for Liberal Democrat disappointment. In particular, the party 
fared less well than expected against the Conservatives, gaining only three seats and losing 
five. That was despite heavy targeting which has previously been successful. For example, 
there were fifteen seats where the Liberal Democrats were fighting the Conservatives and 
needed a swing of 5 per cent or below (a standard measure for 'most winnable' seats) to win. 
Many others were targeted too, but these were the seats where targeting was most obviously 
appropriate if past experience was a guide. Yet of these fifteen, the party only won two 
(Taunton, and Westmorland and Lonsdale, with the third gain from the Conservatives coming 
in Solihull which needed a bigger swing). Of the other thirteen seats, the gap between the 
Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives actually widened in ten, with swings ranging from 
0.15 per cent to 7.48 per cent to the Conservatives. Local factors will have affected different 
seats, but the general pattern was of failing to make progress against the Conservatives, 
despite using methods which had previously delivered results. Why did this happen? Peering 
behind the swing figures shows that in six of these ten seats where there was a Liberal 
Democrat to Conservative swing, the total number of Liberal Democrat votes actually 
increased compared to 2001. However, the Conservative vote increased by even more. The 
likely explanation for this, and the one favoured inside Liberal Democrat HQ, is that the 
Conservatives were more effective than the Liberal Democrats at getting their voters actually 
to vote. Internal Liberal Democrat polling in key seats showed that the party successfully 
increased the numbers intending to vote Liberal Democrat, but that on election day, there was 
a differential turnout with more Conservatives actually voting. Nationally, the British Election 
Study also provides evidence which could support that conclusion.6  
Such improvements in Conservative campaigning raise questions about the overall Liberal 
Democrat message, and the party's campaign. Did the Conservatives get their vote out 
because they had a more invigorating message, or because they were better at grass roots 
campaigning? Several explanations have been offered in the media by journalists, defeated 
candidates, and unnamed 'senior Liberal Democrats', and also behind the scenes by Liberal 
Democrat parliamentarians. These arguments can be divided into five categories: policy, 
campaign management, continuity, vision, and leadership. First, it has been said that some 
Liberal Democrat policies put off former Conservatives. Sue Doughty, the former MP for 
Guildford, told the Today programme on 11 May that she felt local income tax had cost her 
the seat. She said, 'We found that the Tories were able to target local income tax and to tell 
people that taxes would rise. In a lot of cases it wouldn't have risen, but it was very hard to 
make that point to people.' Responding, Ed Davey MP pointed out that he had won Kingston 
with the same policy, and he has subsequently argued that the policy must be kept as he 
believes it is both right and popular? This all means that the debate on local income tax is 
sure to continue, but it is not the only aspect of policy which is under fire. In many 
constituencies, opponents highlighted party policies such as allowing sixteen year olds to 
drink alcohol and giving prisoners the vote. Although these are party policy, they were not in 
the manifesto and would not have been implemented by a Liberal Democrat government. 
However, such policies may well have alienated some potential voters, and at the behest of 
the party leadership, it is likely that there will be a debate at the next party conference on 
whether all policy other than that in the 2005 manifesto should be repealed.  
The second area criticised is campaign management. An anonymous 'senior Lib Dem' has 
claimed that Chris Rennard and Tim Razzall failed both to match Conservative efforts on the 
ground, and to produce messages which were targeted towards both Labour and 
Conservative voters. 8 In particular, the campaign has been described as inflexible, which 
made it unable to respond to the Conservative appeal to 'send a message to Tony Blair'. In 
many areas of the country where the Liberal Democrats failed to make progress against the 
Conservatives, it appears that the Conservatives persuaded voters that the best way to 
express discontent about the government was to vote Conservative rather than Liberal 
Democrat. It is said that this helped the Conservatives both to fend off the Liberal Democrat 
challenge in many areas and to win seats from the Liberal Democrats. It can therefore be 
argued that the party should, in the final week of the campaign, have come out with a much 
stronger anti-Labour message than it did, instead of continuing to concentrate on core 
policies. However, part of the accusation of inflexibility seems to stem from a view that 
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having the party leader on a battlebus touring the country makes him less able to respond to events. That 
is more difficult to understand than criticisms of the overall message because one virtue of a 
battlebus is that it allows the media to follow the leader around all day, allowing an 
immediate response by him to any breaking news. Moreover, there were at least two 
examples of the leader's tour changing its plans and visiting different seats at very short 
notice.  
The third issue which may be part of the post mortem is whether Liberal Democrat 
campaigning has gone stale because there has been so much continuity. It was very difficult 
to make that argument when the party was steadily winning every seat in which it built up 
strength. However, the failure to win perennial near misses such as Orpington may lead 
some people to question how much progress, rather than consolidation, targeting can 
deliver. Given that both the other main parties appear to have learnt much from Liberal 
Democrat local campaigns, it may be that its potential to deliver big gains is becoming 
limited, even if it has to continue simply to counteract the efforts being made by the other 
parties. In future, there may have to be greater emphasis on newer techniques such as direct 
mailing of national messages (as Labour did in seats it feared losing), or greater use of 
national telephone banks which were used by the other parties. Much of this will depend on 
resources, but the extent to which future funding can be used differently will highlight how 
far the Liberal Democrat campaign machine is capable of learning new tricks, rather than 
just fine-tuning its tried and tested tactics.  
The fourth criticism which has been made of the campaign is that it lacked an overall vision. 
I made that argument in an article in the Independent, saying that the party has become too 
focused on specific policies and strategic messages, and has not given people an overall 
image of its basic values.9 This is a difficult issue for the party, because while people do vote 
on the basis of policy issues that affect them, most successful parties have an overall image 
which helps sum up their general approach and which is rooted in values rather than policy. 
Both Labour in 1997 and the Conservatives in 1979 are good examples of this. In marketing 
terms, that could be termed a brand, but it is also an ideological issue. There have recently 
been plenty of efforts to work on the party's ideology. In particular, the 2000 pre-manifesto 
was based around the idea of 'freedom' which was the shorthand label given to a reworking 
of the early twentieth century social liberalism of people such as L. T. Hobhouse. The 
freedom theme was then at the core of the 2001 manifesto, entitled Freedom, Justice, Honesty, 
and the party's 2002 values paper, It's about Freedom. Subsequently, in 2004, the party's pre-
manifesto was called Freedom, Fairness, Trust. However, the title of the 2005 manifesto, The 
Real Alternative, was the campaign slogan, which was a strategic rather than an ideological 
statement. Of course, it has to be said that the party made greater progress in 2005 than 
2001. However, as the party draws together greater support from very different backgrounds, 
there may well be greater internal dissension on specific policies, so a unifying vision may 
become more necessary.  
The final set of criticisms may focus on Charles Kennedy's leadership. While there is no 
doubt that he deserves credit for leading the party to two successive increases in vote share 
and parliamentary seats, questions about him remain. He polls very well on issues of trust. 
However, as John Curtice has said, 'he does not seem to have persuaded the public that he is 
a potential prime minister.'l0 For example, a Y ouGov poll showed that 52 per cent of people 
said that he could not cope as Prime Minister. This does not appear to be a big issue in the 
party at the moment, but it is likely that it will be discussed at some point during the current 
Parliament and is one that Kennedy and the party have to address if they are to become a 
party of government.  
These five issues are likely to be debated in the fringe meetings and bars at the next Liberal 
Democrat conference. The media is likely to present the challenges facing the party in terms 
of left versus right: should it be a centre-left party, appealing to disaffected Labour voters, or 
should it be a centre-right party, appealing to Conservatives? This apparently 
straightforward question may make the debate intelligible to the public, but it is unlikely to 
be the perspective from which many Liberal Democrats will approach the issue. That is 
partly because many of the issues which motivate party activists, such as the environment 
and constitutional reform, are not usefully placed on a left-right axis. However, it is also 
because, as the early debates on the direction of the party have shown, party members are far 
more likely to seize on smaller arguments, for example by focusing on one or two particular 
policies, or even on campaign management. In some ways such a practical approach may be 
helpful. However, the results in target seats suggest that if the party continues to believe that 
'more of the same' will result in huge gains, it is likely to receive a shock. Looking at the more 
fundamental issues of the basic purpose of the Liberal Democrats and the way in which that 
message is communicated may yield more results in the long term.  
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